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A virtuous combination of structural and skill analysis to defeat organized crime  
 
 
1. Introduction and summary 
 
Criminal networks arise and develop, to pursue illegal aims, disguising the shady activities performed 
and maximizing the profits. The members of such networks trust one another and look for protection or 
for a privileged access to certain social as well as economic resources (Skaperdas, 2001; Sciarrone, 2009), 
often through the mediation of individuals who offer their services in a “non-transparent” or irregular way 
(Barucci, 2008). Therefore, we cannot consider them as simple networks of interpersonal relationships 
among individuals operating “in the shadow”, or anyway in a criminal contest (Ozgul and Erdem, 2015)1. 
In fact, criminal networks have peculiar characteristics which cannot be underestimated or ignored in 
trying to develop effective preventive and contrastive measures and policies. Several studies highlighted 
how criminal and terrorist organizations carry out their activities in dynamic contexts, in which the 
competitive pressure and repressive intervention by the governments constantly test their existence2. This 
is the reason why, in order to survive and keep on growing up, they had to develop a high resistance 
ability3 as well as a high adaptability to the changing conditions of the environment they operate in. The 
new waves of Islamic terrorism worrying the whole Western world, the proliferation of criminal 
organizations trafficking organs and human beings, as well as the expansion and reproduction abilities of 
the traditional Mafia factions (clans) dramatically show how organized crime is able to progressively 
improve communication tools  and/or recruitment methods to reproduce itself and grow up in the 
globalization era.  
All this is strictly related to peculiar resistance abilities and a particular adaptability, which is 
generally referred to the term and, at the same time, the concept of “resilience”, “borrowed” from other 
sciences and implying the elasticity and adaptability of bodies, passions, systems and even territories 
(Schoon, 2006). The nature and source of such abilities, as far as criminal and terrorist organizations have 
been deeply analysed in several researches4. In fact, such organizations, due to their topological 
characteristics, are considered as an extreme and very interesting case of failure resilient networks, i.e. 
networks which are resilient towards the so-called “cascade failures”5, and therefore they will also be 
analysed in this paper, with particular reference to the structure and resilience ability of two criminal 
networks, the first one set up for international drug and psychotropic substance trafficking and the second 
one operating in the field of public services in some Social and Healthcare Territorial Institutions.  
The analysis is carried out using an interdisciplinary approach as well as the typical techniques and 
concepts of the Social Network Analysis (SNA) in order to develop a reliable indicator of Criminal 
Network Resilience (CNR). The techniques offered by the analysis of social networks have rapidly 
widespread in the last years, even in the study of criminal networks, and their results convinced the 
institutions and law enforcement agencies to use them more and more frequently. In fact, the concept of 
social network was applied to the study of crime and to the several forms in which it operates and 
                                                          
1
 Scholars are still debating on this issue. They are trying to determine if criminal networks may be assimilated to 
other type of social networks (Pedahzur and Perliger, 2006; Eberle, 2012) and if, in particular, the several organized 
crime forms set up to commit crimes and to obtain, directly or indirectly, financial or material benefits, have the 
same topological and solidity characteristics of the other real networks, such as the Internet, biological networks or 
the networks of bibliographical quotes and scientific cooperation (Albert et al., 2000; Watts et al., 1998). However, 
the most recent empirical studies show that, due to their typical characteristics (secrecy, decentralization), this kind 
of organizations cannot be in any way assimilated to other social networks (Lindelauf et al. (2009), Natarajan (2006) 
and Ozgul and Erdem (2015)). 
2 See, among other things, Skaperdas (2001), pp. 184 and ff., and Ayling (2009), p. 182. 
3
 See Agreste at al. (2016). 
4
 The differences between terrorist networks and other criminal networks have been well illustrated in a recent study 
by Ozgul (2016). He also classifies terrorist network topologies into six topology types and examines the different 
way in which the key player problem arises in this particular type of social networks.  
5 See above all Gutfraind, who carried out some researches (Gutfraind, 2010 and 2011) on different kinds of 
criminal networks in order to identify a topology which, for itself, could guarantee a good resistance level towards 
cascade failures. See also Callahan, Shakarian et al. (2012) and McGuire (2014). 
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organizes, but above all to the analysis of transnational crime and terrorist networks (Sparrow, 1991; 
Waring, 1993; Klerks, 2001; Morselli, 2009; Krebs, 2001; Calderoni, 2014; Strang, 2014; Ozgul, 2016).  
The network approach widespread in a contagious way among researchers, the law enforcement 
agencies and the authorities charged with the application of law in each country because it is considered 
as a more efficient and effective tool to combat organized crime than the traditional investigative methods 
(like wiretapping: see Agreste et al., 2016) and the traditional criminal intelligence techniques (Castiello, 
2015). In fact, there is the conviction that it is an inestimable instrument able to put together and to 
interpret different information and several observations by detecting an understandable model of 
behaviour and social action able to show the logic, or the “rules of the game”, ruling the relationships 
among individuals (Ianni A. and Ianni R.E., 1990). Moreover, the use of this technique to the study of 
criminal organizations could be very useful to understand how they exchange information, weave 
relationships and partnerships with affiliates and other types of partner in crime, taking “new productive 
forces”, organize their relationships interpersonal and alliances with members of the so-called “gray area” 
in which lurk the relationships of complicity and collusion of the professional, economic, political and 
cultural worlds with the criminal world. The application of the SNA may be helpful even in the legal 
field6, in order to better define the areas of contiguity to the mafia groups (in particular, in all cases of 
external collaboration and support of criminal organizations7, including those of complicity in the mafia-
related criminal conspiracy, typical of the common law systems8) and to develop more effective legal 
instruments of prevention and repression of organized crime. 
This paper is structured as follows: in the second section we will try to identify the key concepts and 
some methodological criteria to define a reliable indicator of criminal networks resilience (or, more in 
general, of dark network resilience9) in an appropriate way; in the third section it will analyses the 
structure and the characteristics of the concerned networks, highlighting how the combined use of the 
analysis techniques of complex networks and of the economy of human capital as well may bring to the 
development of more effective and efficient policies able to contrast organized crime; finally, in the 
fourth section it will try to draw some conclusions and to propose some policies to combat the organized 
crime. 
 
 
2. Criminal networks resilience: key concepts and methodological criteria 
 
Before developing a reliable indicator of Criminal Network Resilience (CNR), it is necessary to define 
some key concepts identifying the fundamental characteristics of a criminal network and differentiating it 
from the other social networks.     
First of all, a criminal network is characterized by the secrecy and covering (or protection) level it is 
able to guarantee to its members10. Usually, such a characteristic does not belong to other social 
organizations and implies the existence of firm trust relationships among the members. In fact, studies on 
social capital show that trust is often a necessary condition, even if not sufficient, to set up a cooperation 
for any kind of purposes. However, the huge literature on the Mafia phenomenon highlights how criminal 
organizations are “interested in maintaining a low and impersonal level of general trust, as in this way the 
demand in the personalised trust they are able to offer and guarantee increases” (Sciarrone, 2009). 
Another fundamental characteristic of such organizations is their networking ability, i.e. their ability to 
build relationships, to make alliances, to establish exchanges, as well as to promote mutual obligations 
and favours. Not only they are interested in integrating in their network a certain individual, but also in 
                                                          
6
 Partially, the potential benefits arising from the application of SNA to the legal field have already been highlighted 
by Agreste et al. (2016). 
7
 For an in-depth analysis of common trends and differences in the ways in which, in civil law countries, 
jurisprudence and doctrine deal with the phenomenon of the proximity to criminal organizations, see Visconti 
(2010). 
8
 For a detailed description of the differences between conspiracy and complicity, see Brody, Acker and Logan 
(2001), McSorley (2003) and Sergi (2015). 
9
 Including in this denomination all types of network which operate covertly and illegally, such as insurgent 
networks, terrorist groups or narcotics-trafficking networks. For a more in-depth analysis of these networks and a 
preliminary theory of dark network resilience, see Bakker et al. (2011). 
10
 See, in this regard, Fielding (2017) and Lindelauf et al. (2009). 
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accessing to and maybe activating the network the individual already belongs to. This allows the several 
members of those networks to act, according to the circumstances, as mediators, patrons, protectors, in 
relationship structures of different forms and nature they are able to exploit in order to reach their illegal 
aims.  
The SNA shows that a high clustering coefficient and a low average path length among the nodes of a 
network (typical features of many social networks, neural networks, computer networks and, in general, 
of all the small world networks11) promote the communication and relationships of the individuals in the 
network, thus making this latter more “effective”. However, these characteristics of the network can 
threaten its security, as a wider sharing of the information inside it may substantially help the intelligence 
activity carried out by the enforcement agencies, reducing the secrecy and covering level of the network 
itself. This is the reason why we think (see Enders and Su, 2007; Lindelauf et al., 2009 and 2011) that 
criminal organizations have to address a clear trade-off between effectiveness and security of the network, 
between the aims concerning security and those concerning the uncontrolled flow of information every 
day. Therefore, the fundamental dilemma of each criminal organization is balancing its need for strategic 
initiatives resulting from a wide access to certain resources (goods, services, information), gained by 
using weak links, with the need for consolidated and trusted collaborations, promoting secrecy, protection 
as well as repression of those behaviours which do not comply with the aims of the organization and 
implemented through the application of rules and sanctions (Ozgul and Erdem, 2015). 
Another characteristic which is essential in determining (or in increasing) the resilience of a criminal 
network is represented, as already underlined (see § 3.1), by its topology (Xu and Chen, 2008; Ayling 
2009). A “mixed-star” structure guarantees, without any doubt, a particular resistance to random attacks 
while the redundancy in connections and a minimum low average distance guarantee the continuity of the 
illegal activities on the one side, in case one or more nodes are removed, and a better communication 
system on the other side (time to task). On the contrary, a decentralized and widespread structure allows a 
higher confidentiality in communication. Nonetheless, a highly decentralized network makes it more 
difficult to manage the trafficking activities (for instance drugs and money) and to move resources12.  
Some criminal networks may have important dimensions and act at international level. In order to 
detect their structure and measure their organizational dimension, we use the centrality and centralization 
indexes. While the first ones identify the position of each nodes in the network, the second ones measure 
the level of hierarchization of the first one as the whole. Low and high values in the centralization level 
indicate, respectively, a low and high level of hierarchization. If centralization is based on the control of 
the information flows (rush or betweenness), it indicates, in case of high values, that some members of 
the network are in a position of brokerage and that the network, in order to function, needs intermediaries 
connecting its various subgroups. 
Finally, another distinctive characteristic of some criminal brotherhoods is the robustness. In SNA this 
term usually indicates the ability of a network to maintain its own connectivity characteristics even after a 
fraction f of its nodes has been removed. Of course, such a characteristic has some immediate practical 
effects and concerns those processes which can be carried out through a network. Therefore, it is not by 
chance that this was one of the first characteristics of networks to be analysed in literature, especially with 
reference to complex networks, such as the Internet, the transportation or energy networks. However, 
such characteristic also distinguishes some kinds of criminal networks, such as the Mafia organizations, 
in which the redundancy in connections, typical of the family clusters, allows to immediately substitute 
any arrested or killed members. 
According to these observations, part of the literature (Ozgul and Erdem, 2015) tried to propose a very 
simple way to define a reliable CNR indicator envisaging that the resilience of a criminal network results 
from the following elements: 
1) the level of secrecy or coverage of the criminal network, which can be defined through the 
analysis of transitive triple calculating, the so-called Clustering Coefficient (CC);  
2) the level of spreading of the knowledge and information inside the network, measured by the 
average geodesic distance (Average Path Length, APL) separating all pairs of its nodes; 
                                                          
11
 See Watts and Strogatz (1998), Wang and Chen (2003), Telesford et al. (2011) and Castiello (2015). 
12
 In-depth studies carried out on this topic (Everton, 2006; Locke, 1995) show different performance levels related 
to the kind of structure. Networks with too much centralized or decentralized structures tend to have lower 
performance levels in comparison with networks with an intermediate centralization degree.   
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3) the leaders average centrality (Average Centrality of Leaders, ACL), which in a criminal network 
shows how much authority is actually in the hands of those who act like leaders; 
4) the total number of the members of the network, which gives an approximate measure of the 
robustness of the network (Robustness, R). 
In this way we can identify a first simple algorithm able to estimate the resilience of a criminal 
network, or its resistance ability and adaptability to the changing conditions of the environment in which 
it operates:  
[1] 




 ⋅⋅
=
APL
RCCACLlogφ  
However, as already highlighted (see § 3.1), the previously listed characteristics are not the only 
elements able to affect the level of resilience of a given criminal network. In order to define an effective 
direct attack strategy able to disjoint criminal networks, it is also necessary to take into account the great 
amount of the available social and human capital. The Ozgul and Erdem algorithm showed at [1] 
represents a valid instrument to measure the CNR as well as a valid basis to develop new and more 
effective policies to contrast organized crime. However, it does not take into account that the resilience of 
criminal networks often depends on personal training and qualities, as well as on the essential skills of 
their members. In these cases, in fact, if an individual with specialist knowledge and skills is removed 
(e.g., arrested or killed), the network may be unable to replace them with an individual of commensurate 
quality, leading to suboptimal functional capacity of the network13.  
Therefore, the above-mentioned indicator should be integrated as follows: 
[2] 




 ⋅⋅⋅
=
APL
AHCRCCACLlogφ  
where AHC is the Average Human Capital, that is the value of the skills and competences which 
ensures the normal functioning of the network and the achievement of objectives pursued by the criminal 
organization. This element gives an approximate measure of the human capital available by the members 
in the network to carry out the unlawful activities and reach the common illegal aims. This index can 
theoretically range from + 1 to + ∞14. Its value should reflect the appropriateness of personal skills of the 
individual players in the network – as evidenced by the assessment made by investigators or prosecutors 
in judicial documents – to the aims and the activities carried out by the criminal organization.15. 
 
3. Analysis of the resilience of the observed criminal networks  
 
The analysis of resilience of the observed criminal networks is based on several type of judicial 
documents (depositions, interrogations, warrants of arrest and verdicts) issued by the judicial authority 
during recent police operations aimed at dismantling two dangerous criminal networks engaged in 
                                                          
13
 For further information about the factors that strengthen or weaken the resilience of dark networks, see Bakker et 
al. (2010). 
14
 1 is the minimum value of AHC that includes all non-specialist skills which in any case contribute to the 
functioning of the criminal organization. Obviously, the AHC changes with R, that is, with the number of members 
of the criminal organization that can be theoretically infinite. 
15
 In this paper we do not address the problem of measuring the special skills owned by the members of criminal 
network, but it is obvious that the question of the motivation of choosing a specific measure of them should be the 
subject of a future analysis. It is known, in fact, that human capital measurement methods are the most diverse, not 
only because of the diversity of theoretical settings, but also for the multitude of statistical methodologies and 
information on which measurements are based. Any use of an indicator which is not an efficient or appropriate 
measure for the cognitive purposes of the survey may be misleading for the scholar of these social phenomena. We 
must consider, too, that there are no databases collecting information on the level of skills possessed by members of 
criminal networks. To date, for sociological and economic literature this interesting area of investigation is still 
completely unexplored. 
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international illicit drugs trafficking16 and in supplying health and social services at a local level. In 
particular, the first operation was named “Freccia Sarda”17 (Sardinian Arrow) and allowed to identify a 
group of Nigerian and Italian criminals engaged in international drug trafficking among Sardinia, 
Campania, South America and Holland. The second operation was named “Il principe e la scheda 
ballerina”18 (The prince and the dancing card) and allowed to arrest several members and flankers of a 
clan belonging to the Casalesi family, a famous Camorra cartel, composed of 10 clans, operating in the 
sector of social and healthcare services in some Municipalities and Territorial Districts of the province of 
Caserta19. The analysis of two criminal networks aimed at carrying out different offenses is very useful 
because it serves to highlight how individuals with different skills and competences exist in almost all 
types of criminal organizations. Generally, such individuals are members of these organizations or 
collaborate externally with them albeit they formally do not form part of criminal networks. This involves 
the need to in-depth study these cases to create public policies and legal instruments appropriate to 
discourage any form of collaboration between the abovementioned individuals and criminal 
organizations, as well as to fight all kinds of mafia contiguity currently pursued with toothless weapons 
(that is with ineffective and inefficient tools)20.            
 
4.1. “Freccia Sarda” Operation 
4.1.1. Topological analysis of the observed criminal network 
 
The observed criminal network is made up of three different criminal organizations tracing back to 
some Italian and non-EU citizens (coming from Nigeria, Kenya and Ghana). The network has, as shown 
later, a cellular structure, which is typical of several complex networks. The organization had two 
operating bases, one in Castel Volturno, in the province of Caserta; the other in Cagliari, Sardinia. Drug 
trafficking, above all heroin and cocaine, involved Italy, South America, the United Kingdom and 
Holland.  
The network was made up of 70 actors and 125 connections. The connections among the members of 
the network came from information or resource exchanges (drug, money) and this is the reason why we 
chose to analyse this kind of relationships by symmetrizing its connections.  
The level of cohesion measured thought the “density” of the network shows a very low value (0,052) 
that means almost 5% of all possible connections is present. This value highlights a very low level of 
cohesion of the group. The average degree level is 3,50 degree for each node, i.e. each individual 
activated, on average, almost 3,5 edges, a value confirming the reduced level of cohesion of the group. As 
there are not many direct connections among the several members of the network, we can assume that the 
communications or the exchanges of resources and information were guaranteed by indirect connections, 
i.e. by individuals acting as intermediaries. 
The structure of the network shows a distribution of degree which follows a power law, a high 
clustering coefficient and a low minimum average distance among all pairs of nodes inside the network 
(“small world” effect). The Alpha value of the level distribution (2,48), the p-value (0,81) and the value 
of the goodness of fit (GOF = 0,051) confirm the characteristics of a scale-free network. The 62% of the 
connections is distributed on 4 main hubs which can be referred to four actors N19, N18, N63 and N47, 
                                                          
16
 For a description of the different disciplinary approaches to studying illicit drug markets, see Ritter (2006). More 
specifically, then, for an economic analysis of the features and functioning of the markets for illicit drugs, see 
Caulkins and Reuter (2006).  
17 The investigation has been coordinated by the D.D.A. (Local Anti-Mafia Investigation Department) of Cagliari 
and carried out by the Oristano Police Department. 
18 The investigation has been coordinated by the D.D.A. (Local Anti-Mafia Investigation Department) of Naples and 
carried out by the Comando Provinciale dei Carabinieri of Caserta.  
19
 For further details about Casalesi cartel, see Italian Minister of the Interior (2010 and 2016). 
20
 Breaking the connections between criminal organizations and “compliant contiguity” areas from which they 
derive qualified support must be the priority goal of a strategy that aims at seriously counteracting the political, 
social and economic pervasiveness of mafia-type phenomena. The troubled Italian experience of the “external 
collusion with the mafia-type associations” shows the big difficulties which policy makers and legal practitioners 
(judges, lawyers and legislators) have to face to find weapons suitable for reaching this goal. See, regarding to the 
Italian case, Amarelli (2017), Centonze (2013), Maiello (2014), Visconti (2010) and Fiandaca (2010). 
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controlling the whole drug trafficking process, from the import of the substances produced in South 
America to the distribution in Sardinia. The highest values of degree and betweenness are mainly 
distributed on three actors (N63, N18 and N19) and less on actor N47 (see Fig.1). 
 
Fig. 1 – “Freccia Sarda” Operation. Distribution of the degree and betweenness centrality 
 
Source: Our processing of the data supplied by the D.D.A. (Local Anti-Mafia Investigation Department) of Cagliari. 
 
Moreover, the analysed network shows a quite hierarchized structure, the degree centralization index 
is 35,93%, while the betweenness has a value of 60,93% and this supports the idea that most of the 
relationship activity of the network is carried out by mediators or brokers. In fact, the analysis of the 
“brokerage” (see Fig. 2) highlights how most of the intermediation activity refers to nodes N18, N19 and 
N63, which actually connect one another the several parts of the network. They have a structural position 
of gatekeepers, i.e. they can act like “guardians”, as they control the information and resources of people 
outside the group they belong. 
 
Fig. 2 – “Freccia Sarda” Operation. Analysis of the brokerage activity 
 
 
Source: Our processing of the data supplied by the D.D.A. (Local Anti-Mafia Investigation Department) of Cagliari. 
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The average path length among the nodes of the network is 2,932, while the average clustering 
coefficient   is 0,673. If we compare these two values with those resulting from a random network of the 
same size and average degree, it results in the following:  
− as far as the clustering coefficient is concerned, a great difference, i.e. 0,673 for the real network 
and 0,054 for the random network;  
− as far as average path length is concerned, a more moderate difference, i.e. 2,932 for the observed 
network and 3,374 for the random network.  
Such values confirm the “small world” characteristic of the criminal organization taken into account. 
The reduced average path length among the nodes and the high level of local cohesion guarantee the 
network a high level of effectiveness, which is functional to the success of the activities related to drug 
import and distribution. 
As far as the nature of the connections among the actors of the main hubs of the network is concerned, 
the prevalence of family or emotional connections was highlighted (strong ties), strengthened by an ethnic 
bond (the organization is mainly made up of non-EU people, with the participation of some Italian 
individuals), while in minor roles (ovule-eating carriers, small pushers) the prevalence of weak 
connections (weak ties) simply based on acquaintances or role similarities was highlighted (Granovetter, 
1973). 
The relationship dynamics show a tendency of the minor actors (carriers and medium-level pushers) to 
connect with those showing a high degree (preferential attachment), as they have particular abilities or 
fitness (Mosca and Villani, 2012; Barabàsi, 2002) in managing drug trafficking, because they are able to 
develop and maintain contacts with higher level suppliers (international traffickers) and the ability to earn 
money from the drug sale.  
 
 
4.1.2. Analysis of the resilience level of the observed criminal network 
 
We can assume that the observed network shows the typical characteristics of scale-free networks and 
the “small world” as well. Such characteristics give it, as noticed, a high level of effectiveness in 
managing illegal trafficking and, in general, a good level of robustness towards random attacks. 
Nonetheless, we wished to check the robustness of the observed network and its characteristics by 
simulating two kinds of attack.  
The first kind of network attack (“random attack 1”) aimed at randomly removing all nodes with a low 
level of degree, between 1 and 3, i.e. ovule-eating couriers or low-level pushers; the second attack 
(“random attack 2”), the one which was actually carried out by the police thanks to the information 
acquired by the investigating bodies, aimed at neutralizing all couriers and pushers recruited by clan 
leaders or by those acting like mediators for drug transportation (specifically affecting actors, in this case, 
are N34, N9, N1, N24, N45 and N31)21. 
The results of the two attacks are listed in Table 1 and showed in Figure 3 here below.  
 
Table 1 – “Freccia Sarda” Operation. Analysis of the network topology and of the effects of simulated random attacks 
 Original network Random attack 1 Random attack 2 
    
Size 70 34 63 
Alpha 2,48 2,75 2,31 
P-value 0,81 0,71 0,84 
GOF 0,051 0,058 0,04 
Clustering coefficient 0,67 0,72 0,61 
Avarage path lenght 2,93 2,75 2,93 
    
Source: Our processing of the data supplied by the D.D.A. (Local Anti-Mafia Investigation Department) of Cagliari. 
                                                          
21
 We considered this second attack random, because the police forces ignored the whole network and they arrested, 
by a parallel operations, only drug dealers less connected (drug couriers). On the contrary, for an assessment of the 
effectiveness of sequential police attacks, see Agreste et al. (2016). 
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Fig. 3 - “Freccia Sarda” Operation. Representation of the original network and of the simulated random attacks 
 
3.A. Original network. 
 
 
 
3.B. Network after random attack 1. 
 
3.C. Network after random attack 2. 
 
 
 
Source: Our processing of the data supplied by the D.D.A. (Local Anti-Mafia Investigation Department) of Cagliari. 
 
It is easy to notice that, despite some actors of the network were removed, its structure remains intact 
(see Table 1). In fact, it maintains the same characteristics of the original graph (Fig. 3.A.), both by just 
removing 7 nodes (Fig. 3.B.) and by removing 36 nodes (Fig. 3.C.), i.e. more than the half of the 
members of the network.  
As far as the topological characteristics are concerned, the observed network is resilient to the random 
attacks towards the nodes with a low degree. On the contrary, if the contrasting (repressive) activity 
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concerns the hubs characterized by a high value of betweenness, the results are diametrically opposed: by 
removing N18, N19 and N63, which represent the heads of the criminal organization, the network breaks 
up in 21 components, of which two are made up of 24 and 18 nodes respectively (Fig. 4.B). This brings to 
the loss of leading figures in the organization and to serious damages to the drug trafficking process. 
Therefore, the obtained results show, how it was possible to notice, that the attacks carried out 
following the social capital approach bring to an important breaking up of the network, even if it is 
necessary to underline that the observed network is still alive and operating, thanks to the preservation of 
some members with particular skills and able to guarantee its survival and “regular functioning”22: N58, 
close to N47 and N63, called “‘o professore” (the professor), who dealt with the recruitment and legal 
assistance for the arrested carriers; N62, brother of N63, who was substituted by the first one, after his 
arrest, in the management of illegal trafficking, thanks to the skills of N30; N11, wife of N19, who 
revealed a woman able to manage drug trafficking on behalf of her husband; N41, partner of N18, who 
maintained the contacts with carriers and customers; N47, head of that part of the organization located 
abroad, who, thanks to two inside men living in the Netherlands and in the United Kingdom, N8 and N21, 
dealt with the import and distribution of drugs from South America to Italy. 
If we really wish to weaken the network, we need to implement a different strategy aiming at affecting 
those individuals who have the above-mentioned particular skills. In other words, we need to adopt a 
contrasting (repressive) strategy based not only on social capital, but also on the available human capital 
inside the network. Later in this paragraph we try to estimate the effectiveness of a similar strategy by 
simulating an attack aimed at removing all nodes which cannot be easily substituted, as they have special 
skills and are connected with the hubs of the network by strong connections.  
Table 2 and Figure 4 show the obtained results. The attack carried out following the human capital 
strategy breaks the network up in two components: the first one made up of 2 nodes; the second one made 
up of 60 nodes and 88 edges (connections). However, even if the network preserves its characteristics of 
scale-free and “small world”, the latter seems to be in this case much less resilient, because it lost the 
highly professional skilled elements able to guarantee the regular functioning of the network even when it 
was under attack. 
 
Table 2 – “Freccia Sarda” Operation. Social capital and human capital strategies 
  Original network Random attack Human capital attack 
Arrested or killed criminals 0 7 9 
Size 70 63 61 
Alpha 2,48 2,31 2,52 
P-value 0,81 0,84 0,33 
GOF 0,05 0,05 0,79 
Clustering coefficient 0,67 0,61 0,67 
Average Centrality leader 0,33 0,28 0,27 
Average Path Lenght 2,93 2,94 2,98 
Average Human Capital* 1,71 1,71 1,00 
Ozgul-Edmer algorithm   1,67 1,31 1,30 
Our algorithm 2,20 1,85 1,30 
    
Notes: * The minimum value of the Average Human Capital is 1 (no individual with special skills). 
Source: Our processing of the data supplied by the D.D.A. (Local Anti-Mafia Investigation Department) of Cagliari. 
 
                                                          
22
 Recent research related to the illicit drug market in Australia has shown that some of the individuals in the 
methamphetamine networks possess highly specialized knowledge and/or skills (e.g., chemistry knowledge, 
knowledge of law enforcement tactical measures). The most obvious examples of this are the corrupt officials and 
the cook/cook instructors. These roles and specializations are of critical importance for methamphetamine networks 
functioning. In fact, the presence of role differentiation and replication implies that, with the exception of the leaders 
and brokers, the removal of a network participant is unlikely to lead to network collapse. See again Bakker et al. 
(2010). 
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The use of the resilience indexes we have previously described (see § 3.2) clearly confirms the greater 
effectiveness which distinguishes the attacks carried out following the human capital strategy than the 
random attacks based on the social capital approach (see Table 2). In fact, if we compare the resilience 
level of the network before and after the attacks, we can see how these latter significantly broke the 
criminal network. After the attack it appears much more weakened. But while random attacks only 
brought to a net reduction in the average centrality level of leaders (from 0,33 to 0,28), significantly 
reduce the power they can exert inside the network, the attacks based on human capital caused a 
significant reduction in the spreading of the knowledge and information inside the network. In fact, in this 
last case the average geodesic distance has significantly increased (from 2,93 to 2,98). Ozgul’s and 
Edmer’s algorithm does not clearly detect this difference. In fact, it has only slightly decreased – 
precisely by 0,8% – in the case of the attacks based on the human capital strategy. On the contrary, the 
resilience index proposed by this research is much more sensitive and able to measure the effects caused 
by such attacks. In the concerned case it has significantly decreased: by 16%, as far as random attacks are 
concerned, to 30%, as far as human capital attacks are concerned.  
The graph shown in Fig. 4.C. allows us to make an important observation. Even after the attack based 
on human capital, the criminal network remains intact and functioning. Even if it loses 10 nodes, it keeps 
on enjoying a high level of robustness (as highlighted by the values Alpha, Goodness of fit and p-value) 
and effectiveness (measured by the Clustering Coefficient and by the Average Path Lenght). Actually, 
removing or seizing those individuals having particular professional skills and competences that it is 
difficult to substitute, at least in a short term, paralyses the organization activities. Identifying such a 
paradox is essential and suggests the adoption of new and more effective repression policies, able to 
combine the benefits brought by the adoption of attack strategies based on social capital with the benefits 
resulting from the application of strategies based on human capital.           
 
Fig. 4 - “Freccia Sarda” Operation. Representation of the original network and of the effects caused by the simulated attacks    
 
4.A. Original network. 
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4.B. Network after selected attack based on the social capital approach. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.C. Network after attack based on the human capital approach. 
 
 
 
Source: Our processing of the data supplied by the D.D.A. (Local Anti-Mafia Investigation Department) of Cagliari. 
 
4.2. “Il principe e la scheda ballerina” Operation  
4.2.1. General analysis of the observed criminal network 
 
The second criminal network analysed in this research is made up of a clan operating in a wide area in 
the province of Caserta and known with the unappropriate nickname of “clan dei casalesi” (Casalesi 
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clan)23. It is – as reported in the data taken from the warrant of arrest named “The prince and the dancing 
card” – a federate criminal group, which dominates in the province of Caserta. From the ’70s of the last 
century until today it has exerted a great political and economic power, collecting a significant quantity of 
wealth and assets, that were re-invested in several activities through a wide network of relationships and 
the support of the population living in the area where the organization had most of its influence24.  
The interest of this organization in the public services field is related to the conquering logic of this 
dangerous criminal group. In fact, this field may not seem so profitable at first sight, or anyway not so 
lucrative as the fields of cement, agriculture, tourism and waste. However, at a deeper analysis, if we 
carefully look at the data supplied by the D.D.A. (Local Anti-Mafia Investigation Department) of Naples, 
we can see how the concerned field was used as a social legitimation instrument, i.e. as a means to 
increase its authority as well as the quantity of social capital available for the members of the 
organization. The reason for this activity has to be searched for in its ability to produce and grow the thick 
network of relationships connecting Mafia with politics, business and civil society in general and which 
represents the so-called “grey area” allowing the Mafia business to hide and to expand. 
For this reason, the analysed network shows a high level of complexity, determined above all by the 
extreme variety of the individuals belonging to it (see Fig. 5). Among them there are not only the 
supporters of the Camorra group taken into account, but also Public organs, politicians, entrepreneurs, 
social cooperatives, public administrators and even people with no previous convictions. Among the 
several offences listed in the warrant of arrest, a dense network of relationships aimed at controlling the 
contracts and direct assignations in the field of public services is described. Moreover, illegal behaviours 
aimed at controlling the votes by some candidates to the political elections in Public bodies were 
illustrated. In particular, votes were influenced by paying amounts of money, through Mafia 
intimidations, illegal behaviours in the dynamics of the election committee and, finally, by promising the 
recruitment in some social cooperatives providing health and social services, whose reference partner, 
1LL, was a local entrepreneur deemed to be close to some apical members of the Schiavone family clan.     
If we look at the morphology of the network we can identify three main cores: two of them are mainly 
polycentric but, while the central core is mainly made up of entrepreneurs, local politicians and civil 
servants, the one located above on the right side of the network is mostly made up of criminals, in 
particular of members close to the Casalesi cartel. Instead, the core located on the left side of the network 
is strongly polarized and above all made up of local bodies and individuals operating in the non-profit 
sector, in particular of social cooperatives, close to N1LL, supplying health and social services in several 
Municipalities. The three above-mentioned cores are connected one another through less stable and 
consolidated connections, but are more widespread and branched, which makes the network more 
dynamic and open to relationships with other sectors and environments of the civil society. 
However, the criminal organization in itself (see Fig. 6) was mainly made up of the Schiavone family 
(whose prominent members are N5Boss, N25Boss and N19 area leader) and of the Bidognetti family (N8, 
N9), that since the half of the ’90s has shared the undisputed domain of the clan. In carrying out the 
illegal activities of the organization an entrepreneur (N1LL) had a leading role: this was the legal 
representative of an Association of social cooperatives (33Agac) and, at the same time, also controlling 
other cooperatives indicated in the graph showed in Fig. 5 under numbers 32, 34 and 35. Such 
cooperatives recruited people “indicated” by local political candidates (N2, N3 and N16), who exploited 
N1LL for various activities to build and make their own election success grow. Moreover, the above-
mentioned entrepreneur, thanks to his close relationships with the Schiavone family clan (N5Boss), used 
the protection and intimidation power of the criminal group as well as other “services” offered by its 
dangerous members, thus preserving an important market position in the field of the contracts for public 
services in the provinces of Naples and Caserta.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
23 The use of the term “casalesi” (Casalesi clan) determined the assimilation of an entire population living in the 
Caserta area, in particular, in the city of Casal di Principe, to the criminal organization operating in such territories, 
seriously damaging the reputation and negatively affecting (stigma) social and economic relationships. 
24 See Parliamentary Investigation Committee on the Mafia phenomenon and on the other similar criminal 
associations (1994). 
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Fig. 5 -“Il Principe e la scheda ballerina” Operation. The connection network of the criminal organization (link analysis). 
 
 
 
 
Source: Our processing of the data supplied by the D.D.A. (Local Anti-Mafia Investigation Department) of Naples. 
 
 
Fig. 6 - “Il Principe e la scheda ballerina” Operation. The relationship network of the criminal organization (SNA). 
 
 
 
 
Source: Our processing of the data supplied by the D.D.A. (Local Anti-Mafia Investigation Department) of Naples. 
 
N1LL contributed to the clan by paying it a part of its profits according to the managed turnover 
(protection money), by actually recruiting or by promising to recruit individuals close to the clan and, 
finally, by laundering money and other assets of illegal origin. In exchange for that, N1LL obtained 
contracts or assignments by several Municipalities in the province of Caserta, thus significantly 
increasing its turnover as well as the turnover of the companies belonging to the Association 33Agac (to 
which around 100 subsidiary cooperatives belonged for a total of 1,000 employees) and reaching an 
almost monopoly position in the field of public services.  
Also the following people had a leading role in the organization:  
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− N26, ex director of the technical office of a Municipalities in the province of Caserta that, thanks 
to the support of N16, set up a company in the name of his wife N27 (nominee) to financially 
support the construction of a great shopping centre; 
− N28, bank employee in contact with N16, national politician, who from the outside took part in 
the activities of the criminal group by affecting the evaluation of the requests submitted to obtain 
the authorization to open the above-mentioned shopping centre; 
− N2 and N3, politicians, connected with the criminals 5Boss (clan S), N8 and N9 (clan B), who 
exploited for various activities the cooperatives controlled by N1LL for “manipulated” 
recruitments aimed at building their own election success. 
The above-mentioned relationship network generated a criminal system for the management of public 
services which actually did not supply the services planned by the qualified offices, but rather recruited 
health and social operators – under the supervision of individuals trusted by the clan or the local and 
national politicians themselves – in order to meet the above-mentioned individual needs of political and 
commercial exchange. A similar way of recruitment of the staff engaged in social policies highlighted the 
lack of professionalism of the operators in the concerned areas, thus causing situations of clear inefficacy 
towards the aimed public objectives as well as a general mistrust climate towards institutions, which still 
today helps slow down the growth and local development processes through the reconversion of the social 
capital used by the Mafia. 
 
 
4.2.2. Topological analysis of the observed criminal network 
 
Analysing the characteristics of the above-mentioned network we can detect (see Table 3) how it 
shows the structure of a network with a scale-free properties (identified by an Alpha value of 2,03, a p-
value of 0,68 and a goodness of fit of 0,11), combined with the typical characteristics of the “small world” 
networks (in fact, the average path length is 2,22, while the clustering coefficient is 0,66).  
The analysis of the centrality and brokerage measures (see Figures 7 and 8) further explains the 
characteristics and influence of the single actors inside the analysed network.  
 
Fig. 7 – “Il Principe e la scheda ballerina” Operation. Distribution of the degree and betweenness centrality 
 
 
Source: Our processing of the data supplied by the D.D.A. (Local Anti-Mafia Investigation Department) of Naples. 
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Fig. 8 – “Il Principe e la scheda ballerina” Operation. Analysis of the brokerage activity 
 
 
Source: Our processing of the data supplied by the D.D.A. (Local Anti-Mafia Investigation Department) of Naples. 
 
In the 4 categories of individuals involved in the investigation (public employees; private individuals; 
politicians; clan leaders) it is easy to detect those who carried out a more intense intermediation activity. 
The analysis shows that the “strongest” brokers inside the network are, without any doubt, those who 
belong to the clan (N5Boss and N25), followed by politicians (N2 and N3) and private individuals 
(N1LL), while the intermediation activity of public employees, most of them working in the offices of the 
municipal districts involved in the activities carried out by the organization, is virtually irrelevant. 
If we take into account the role of the several individuals inside the network25, it is easy to understand 
how the actors representing the main source of interconnection among the several areas of the network 
are N1LL, N5 and N2. The centralization degree (degree), describing how the network depends on one of 
its leaders, also shows a good level of hierarchization (40,16%), determined by the presence of focal 
actors (hubs), while an intermediate value of the centralization index based on betweenness (37%) it 
shows the presence of actors who control the flows of information related to illegal activities (N2, N3, 
N1LL).  
 
 
4.2.3. Analysis of the resilience level of the observed criminal network 
 
Also in this case, in order to check the robustness level of the network, we carried out two attack 
simulations. The first attack (“random attack”) aims at randomly removing only the nodes with a low 
degree, while the second attack (“hub selective attack”) is based on the social capital approach and, 
therefore, aims at mainly neutralizing the actors characterized by a high value of betweenness (N1LL, N5, 
N2 and N3).  
The results of the two attacks are listed in Table 3 and Figure 9. They show how (see Figures 9.B. and 
9.C.), despite removing the 10 nodes with a degree between 2 and 3, the network maintains the original 
small-world and scale-free properties26. These characteristics potentially guarantee the operating 
continuity and regular functioning of the organization. Instead, the second attack, by removing at least 5 
main hubs (N1LL, N5Boss, N25Boss, N2 and N3), makes the network break up in 7 components (see 
Fig. 9.C.). Therefore, at first sight the observed network seems significantly weakened, but as for various 
                                                          
25 Some actors also cover more than one role, sometimes carrying out the important function of “guardians” (or 
Gatekeepers), i.e. those who are on the borders of a group of individuals and able to control the “access” by those 
belonging to other groups, sometimes carrying out the function of “liason”, when the intermediation activity 
concerns different areas of the network.  
26 The degree distribution indexes have the following values: Alpha = 2,51; positive P-value = 0,23; Gof  = 0,12, while the “small 
world” indexes are: Clustering Coefficient = 0,63; Average Path Lenght = 2,13. 
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aspects it keeps on “enjoying a very good health”. In fact, it is still possible to identify indicators of such 
excellent wellness status of the network:  
a) removing the main hubs does not bring to the loss of the abetment of the institutions in the 
Municipalities concerned by the illegal activities of the clan; actually the network can still trust 
the civil servants working in the technical offices of the municipal districts who can push the 
administrative business to the benefit of the clan;  
b) the network can still count on the representative-sponsor, at the national level, of the interests of 
the clan, a politician closely connected with the Schiavone family clan;  
c) two influential individuals belonging to the Bidognetti family clan are still present inside the 
network (N8 and N9);  
d) the redundancy in connections, typical of the family clusters, which guarantees that each area 
leader of the Schiavone family clan can be substituted and his/her businesses, knowledge and 
power can be transferred;  
e) the rooting on the territory of all individuals involved in the criminal network (clan members, 
politicians, entrepreneurs, public officers). 
 
Table 3 - “Il Principe e la scheda ballerina” Operation. Analysis of the network topology and of the effects produced by 
simulated random attacks 
 Original network Random attack Hub selective attack 
    
Size 32 22 27 
Alpha 2,03 2,52 7 (components) 
P-value 0,68 0,23 
− 
Gof 0,11 0,12 − 
Clustering coefficient 0,66 0,63 − 
Average path lenght 2,22 2,13 − 
    
Source: Our processing of the data supplied by the D.D.A. (Local Anti-Mafia Investigation Department) of Naples.  
 
It is clear that identifying and affecting only the most connected actors (the so-called “key players”) of 
the criminal network and/or the nodes connecting the several groups and subgroups inside the network 
(the so-called “bridge connections” or “bridges”) is not enough to break up its relationships structure. In 
order to be really effective, an attack strategy should identify and remove the minimum set of connections 
and nodes (minimum cut-set) having the precious knowledge, skills and technical abilities – or, in other 
words, human capital – of the criminal network.  
Besides the removed hubs, which had a high “endowment” of human capital (in particular, we are 
referring to actors N1LL, N2 and N3), there are individuals who do not connect the various parts of the 
network one another, but significantly contribute to reach the criminal aims of the organization. Among 
these N16, the politician representative and sponsor of the Casalesi clan; the civil servants working in the 
technical offices of the several Municipalities interested in the illegal business of the organization (in 
particular, N30 close to the Schiavone family clan, N29 and N31); the engineer and entrepreneur N26, 
close to the politicians N2 and N3 due to family ties and, at the same time, with a close business 
relationship with the Casalesi clan for the development of a great shopping centre; N28, ex bank 
employee, able to find abetments and connivances inside the bank sector, and representative of the 
company to which was subcontracted the construction of the above-mentioned shopping centre.  
It is easy to notice (see Figures 10.A. and 10.B.) that removing such nodes (through an attack based on 
the human capital approach) does not imply significant changes in the structure of the network. This 
remains integral and characterized by the same topology (see Table 4), preserving its initial features of 
robustness (as highlighted by the Alpha value, the Goodness of fit value and the p-value) and 
effectiveness (measured by the Cluster Coefficient and the Average Path Length). However, removing the 
above-mentioned actors, who identify individuals with particular competences, professional skills and 
relationships (for instance, think about the connections of N28 in the bank, the coverage of N16 or the 
services supplied by the public officers employed in the technical offices of the municipal districts) and 
who are difficult to replace for this reason, actually paralyzes the activities of the organization, at least in 
the short term, in an irreparable way.  
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Fig. 9 - “Il Principe e la scheda ballerina” Operation. Representation of the original network and of the simulated random 
attacks 
 
9.A. Original network. 
 
 
 
9.B. Network after random attack 1. 
 
 
9.C. Network after selective attack . 
 
 
 
Source: Our processing of the data supplied by the D.D.A. (Local Anti-Mafia Investigation Department) of Naples.  
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The Ozgul and Edmer’s algorithm once again does not allow us to have a clear perception of this 
situation (see Table 4). In fact, it just reduces by 13,07%, while the resilience index proposed in this 
research is much more effective, when it comes to measuring the damages caused by attacks based on the 
human capital strategy. In the concerned case, in particular, it even reduces by 39%, while we realize that 
the random attack aimed at only removing those nodes with a low degree made the resilience level of the 
criminal network increase. In fact, the resilience level increased by 3,19%, according to our algorithm, 
and by 4,6%, if calculated with the Ozgul-Edmer’s algorithm. 
 
Table 4 – “Il Principe e la scheda ballerina” Operation. Social capital and human capital strategies 
 Original network Random attack Human capital attack 
Arrested or killed criminals 0 6 6 
Size 32,00 26,00 26,00 
Alpha 2,03 2,52 2,10 
P-value 0,68 0,23 0,82 
GOF 0,11 0,12 0,11 
Clustering coefficient 0,66 0,75 0,68 
Average Centrality leader 0,45 0,50 0,46 
Average Path Lenght 2,22 2,10 2,15 
Average Human Capital* 1,91 1,91 1,00 
Ozgul-Edmer’s algorithm   1,46 1,53 1,33 
Our algorithm 2,11 2,17 1,33 
    
Notes: * The minimum value of the Average Human Capital is 1 (no individuals with special skills). 
Source: Our processing of the data supplied by the D.D.A. (Local Anti-Mafia Investigation Department) of Naples.  
 
 
Fig. 10 - “Il Principe e la scheda ballerina” Operation. Representation of the effects produced by attacks based on the human 
capital strategy 
 
10.A. Original network. 
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10.B. Network after attack based on the human capital approach. 
 
 
 
Source: Our processing of the data supplied by the D.D.A. (Local Anti-Mafia Investigation Department) of Naples.  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The analysis carried out in this research highlighted the high resistance and adaptation abilities usually 
characterizing criminal networks. In particular, the topological structure of two dangerous criminal 
organizations, employed in international drug trafficking and in supplying Municipalities with public 
services respectively, was analysed. The adopted techniques are the typical tools of the Social Economics 
and of the Social Network Analysis, which in the last years aroused a growing interest and rapidly spread 
even in the analysis of the public policies aimed at reducing criminality and enhancing welfare systems27. 
The data we used were taken from the investigational documents of the police as well as from the 
judgements issued by the ordinary judicial authority within two important crime-prevention operations 
which have been recently carried out. 
Particular attention was dedicated to the concept of resilience and to the development of an 
appropriate set of indicators allowing us to measure the resilience level in an objective way and with 
reference to the structure of the interpersonal relationships inside criminal networks. 
The aim of this research was to explore the potentials, the operating benefits as well as the limits of an 
extension of the application of the SNA and of the analysis of complex networks to the study and 
development of public policies aimed at contrasting and repress Mafia-related phenomena. In particular, 
we tried to check if and to which extent contrasting strategies based on human capital may be used in 
combination with the strategies based on social capital to reduce or neutralize the resistance and 
adaptation abilities of criminal organizations. 
The results show how the elements able to influence the resilience level of a certain criminal network 
are multi-faceted. In the last years crime literature tried to identify some of these elements, but there are 
further and several aspects whose importance is often underestimated, or even ignored, like the level of 
mutual trust as well as the knowledge, skills and technical abilities – or, in other words, human capital – 
available inside criminal networks. The analysis of such elements is fundamental in our opinion to 
develop a valid resilience index of criminal networks, but above all new and more effective policies 
contrasting organized crime. For example, the resilience analysis of criminal networks and the measure of 
the contribution of each of their affiliates or partners to strengthening of it, could help significantly to 
prove with factual evidence their participation in the criminal organization or even simple their closeness 
to it. The SNA and the economic theory of human capital could provide the appropriate tools to develop a 
set of indicators to measure in an objective way the degree to which each node contributes to the 
                                                          
27 See Raiteri (2010).  
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strengthening of the operational capacity of the criminal network or its resilience capacity28. In this sense 
the adoption of new and diversified repression policies based on the analysis both of human and of social 
capital could be profitable, as shown in this research.  
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Highlights  
• The paper proposes the implementation of new and more effective policies to contrast organized 
crime.  
• The paper develops a simple algorithm to estimate the resilience of criminal networks and to 
compare the effects of different attack strategies used by police forces.   
• Obtained results show the high resilience ability of criminal organizations, suggesting A virtuous 
combination of structural and skill analysis.  
• The paper suggests public policies and legal instruments to discourage and fight all kinds of mafia 
contiguity currently pursued with toothless weapons. 
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